Abstract. Non-Interactive Zero Knowledge (NIZK), introduced by Blum, Feldman, and Micali in 1988, is a fundamental cryptographic primitive which has attracted considerable attention in the last decade and has been used throughout modern cryptography in several essential ways. For example, NIZK plays a central role in building provably secure public-key cryptosystems based on general complexity-theoretic assumptions that achieve security against chosen ciphertext attacks. In essence, in a multi-party setting, given a fixed common random string of polynomial size which is visible to all parties, NIZK allows an arbitrary polynomial number of Provers to send messages to polynomially many Verifiers, where each message constitutes an NIZK proof for an arbitrary polynomial-size NP statement.
Introduction
INTERACTIVE ZERO-KNOWLEDGE. Over the last two decades, Zero-Knowledge (ZK) as defined by Goldwasser, Micali, and Rackoff [21] has become a fundamental cryptographic tool. In particular, Goldreich, Micali and Wigderson [20] showed that any NP statement can be proven in computational 1 ZK (see also [16] ). Though ZK was originally defined for use in two-party interactions (i.e., between a single Prover and a single Verifier), ZK was shown to be useful in a host of situations where multiple parties could be involved, especially in the multi-party secure function evaluation, first considered by Goldreich, Micali and Wigderson [19] . Informally, one reason the notion of interactive ZK has been so pervasive is that in the single Prover/Verifier case, ZK essentially guarantees that any poly-time Verifier after interacting with the Prover in a ZK protocol learns absolutely nothing. Thus, informally speaking, whatever a polytime Verifier can do after verifying a ZK protocol, it could also have done before such a ZK interaction. However, in a multiparty setting, perhaps not surprisingly, the standard two-party definition of ZK does not guarantee what we would intuitively expect from "zero knowledge': that the polynomial-time Verifier after observing such proofs can not (computationally) do anything that he was not able to do before such a proofs. Essentially, two important problems were pointed out in the literature:
One problem, formally defined by Dolev, Dwork and Naor [13] is that of malleability, which informally means that an adversary who takes part in some ZK interaction can also interact with other parties and can exploit fragments of ZK interactions to prove something that he was not able to prove before. Indeed, this is a real problem to which [13] propose a solution that requires polylogarithmic overhead in the number of rounds of communication. It is not known how to reduce the number of rounds further in their solution.
Another problem of ZK in the multi-party setting, pointed out by Dwork, Naor and Sahai [14] , is that verifiers can "collaborate" when talking to provers, and the ZK property must be guaranteed even in concurrent executions. Indeed, unless one introduce changes in the model such as timing assumptions, in terms of the number of rounds, it was shown that a polylogarithmic number of rounds is both necessary [6] and sufficient [25] to guarantee concurrent ZK.
NON-INTERACTIVE ZERO-KNOWLEDGE (NIZK):
A way to reduce the number of rounds in a ZK proof (to just a single message from Prover to Verifier) was proposed by Blum, Feldman and Micali [2] by changing the model as follows: we assume that a common random reference string is available to all players. The Prover sends a single message to Verifier, which constitutes "non-interactive zero-knowledge" (NIZK) proof. In [2] it was shown that any NP statement has a NIZK proof. Extending [2] , Blum, De Santis, Micali and Persiano [1] showed how a Prover can prove polynomially many proofs based on algebraic assumptions. Feige, Lapidot and Shamir further refined the definition of NIZK and constructed 2 multiple-proof NIZK based on general assumptions [15] . De Santis and Persiano extended NIZK notion to NIZK Proofs of Knowledge (NIZK-PK) 3 [8] . Again, although the notion of NIZK was defined in a two-party setting, it quickly found applications in settings with many parties, in particular where the same reference string may be used by multiple parties (see e.g. [13, 28, 4, 22] ). Because of the noninteractive nature of NIZK proofs, many multi-party issues that appear in ZK, do not arise in NIZK; for example the problem of concurrent zero-knowledge is completely gone 4 ! The definition of NIZK proposed by [2, 1, 15] , essentially provides the following guarantee: What one can output after seeing NIZK proofs is indistinguishable from what one can output without seeing any proofs, if you consider the reference string as part of the output. Thus, the standard notion of NIZK says that as long as one can simulate proofs together with random-looking reference strings, this satisfies the notion of NIZK. This definition, however, leaves open the question of what to do about output as it relates to the particular reference string that is being used by a collection of parties. Since the NIZK simulator produces its own different random string, its output would make sense only relative to the reference string that it chose, different from the one used by the provers. 5 One of the contributions of this paper is to strengthen the notion of NIZK to insist that the simulator works with the same totally random string that all the Provers work with.
NIZK proofs are broadcastable and transferable -that is, a single proof string can be broadcasted or transferred from verifier to verifier to convince multiples parties of the validity of a statement. However, transferability causes a new problem: a user who have seen an NIZK proof (of a hard problem) can now "prove" (by simply copying) what he was not able to prove before. Indeed, more generally the problem of malleability does remain for NIZK proofs: With respect to a particular (fixed) reference string, after seeing some NIZK proofs, the adversary may be able to construct new proofs that it could not have been able to otherwise. Sahai introduced non-malleable NIZK in [33] where he shows how to construct NIZK which remains non-malleable only as long as the number of proofs seen by any adversary is bounded. In this paper (among other contributions) we continue and extend his work, strengthening the notion and the constructions of non-malleability and removing the limitation on the number of proofs. (For further discussion on malleability issues in multi-party situations, see Appendix A.)
OUR RESULTS: First, we consider the following notion of NIZK. The sampling algorithm produces a common random string together with auxiliary information. (We insist that the common random string comes from a uniform (or nearly uniform) distribution). Polynomially-bounded provers use this common random string to produce polynomially-many NIZK messages for some NP language. We insist that the simulator, given the same common random string, together with auxiliary information, can produce the proofs of theorems which are computationally indistinguishable from the proofs produced by honest provers for the same reference string. We call this notion same-string NIZK.
We show two facts regarding same-string NIZK: (1) same-string NIZK Proofs (i.e. where the prover is infinitely powerful) are impossible for any hard-on-average NPcomplete languages (2) same-string NIZK Arguments (i.e. where the prover is computationally bounded) are possible given any one-way trapdoor permutation.
Next, we turn to non-malleability for NIZK, and a notion related to non-malleability called simulation-soundness first defined by Sahai [33] . The simulation-soundness requirement is that a polynomially-bounded prover can not prove false theorems even after seeing simulated proofs of any statements (including false statements) of its choosing. Sahai achieves non-malleability and simulation-soundness only with respect to a bounded number of proofs. In this paper, we show that assuming the existence of one-way trapdoor permutations, we can construct NIZK proof systems which remain simulation-sound even after the prover sees any polynomial number of simulated proofs 6 . Combined with [33] this also gives the simplest known construction of CCA2-secure public-key cryptosystem based on one-way trapdoor permutations.
In dealing with non-malleability, we next turn to NIZK Proofs of Knowledge (NIZK-PK), introduced by De Santis and Persiano [8] . We use NIZK-PK to propose a strengthening of the definition of non-malleability for NIZK, based on NP-witnesses (which, in particular, implies the earlier definition [33] ). We provide constructions which show that for any polynomial-time adversary, even after the adversary has seen any polynomial number of NIZK proofs for statements of its choosing, the adversary does not gain the ability to prove any new theorems it could not have produced an NP witness for prior to seeing any proofs, except for the ability to duplicate proofs it has already seen. This construction requires the assumption that trapdoor permutations exist and that public-key encryption schemes exist with an inverse polynomial density of valid public keys (called dense cryptosystems). Such dense cryptosystems exist under most common intractability assumptions which give rise to public-key encryption, such as the RSA assumption, Quadratic Residuosity, Diffie-Hellman [8] and factoring [11] . (In fact, in the context of NIZK-PK, we cannot avoid using such dense cryptosystems since they were shown to be necessary for any NIZK-PK [11] . ) Finally, we call NIZK arguments that are both non-malleable and same-string NIZK Robust NIZK.
We highlight the contributions of our results:
-For NIZK arguments, we give the first construction where the simulator uses the same common random string as used by all the provers. -Our Robust-NIZK proof systems are non-malleable with regard to any polynomial number of proofs seen by the adversary and with respect to the same proof-system. (We contrast this with the previous result of [33] which proves non-malleability against only a bounded number of proofs, and in fact the length of the reference string grew quadratically in the bound on the the number of proofs the adversary could see.) In our result, in contrast, the length of the reference string depends only on the security parameter. -Our non-malleable NIZK definition and construction based on NIZK-PK achieves a very strong guarantee: We require that one can obtain an explicit NP witness for any statement that the adversary can prove after seeing some NIZK proofs. Thus, it intuitively matches our notion of what NIZK should mean: that the adversary cannot prove anything "new" that he was not able to prove before (except for copying proofs in their entirety). -Finally, our construction yields the simplest known public-key encryption scheme based on general assumptions which is secure against adaptive chosen-cyphertext attacks (CCA2).
We point out some new techniques used to establish our results. All previous work on non-malleability in a non-interactive setting under general assumptions [13, 12, 33] used a technique called "unduplicatable set selection". Our first construction provides the first non-malleability construction based on general assumptions which does not use "unduplicatable set selection" at all, and rather relies on a novel use of pseudorandom functions of [18] . In our second construction, we show how to generalize the unduplicatable set selection technique to a technique we call "hidden unduplicatable set selection," and use this to build our proofs. Both techniques are novel, and may have further applications.
ORGANIZATION. In Section 2, we both recall old definitions as well as give the new definitions of this paper. In Section 3, we present our first construction of Robust NIZK and non-malleable NIZK (and NIZK-PK) proofs. In Section 4, we present our second construction which uses different techniques and a yields non-malleable NIZK and NIZKPK.
£ " !
is the operation of picking an element uniformly from
is a simple assignment statement. By a "non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time adversary," we always mean a circuit whose size is polynomial in the security parameter. All adversaries we consider are non-uniform. (Thus, we assume our assumptions, such as the existence of one-way functions, also hold against non-uniform adversaries.)
In this section, we will formalize the notions of non-malleable, same-string and robust NIZK proofs. We will also define an extension of simulation soundness.
Basic Notions
We first recall the definition of an (efficient, adaptive) single-theorem NIZK proof systems [1, 2, 15, 8] . Note that since we will always use the now-standard adaptive notion of NIZK, we will suppress writing "adaptive" in the future. We will also only concentrate on efficiently realizable NIZK proofs, and so we will suppress writing "efficient" as well. This first definition only guarantees that a single proof can be simulated based on the reference string. Note that our definition uses "Strong Soundness," based on Strong NIZK Proofs of Knowledge defined in [8] and a similar notion defined in [28] , where soundness is required to hold even if the adversary may chose its proof after seeing the randomly selected reference string. Note that the constructions given in [15] , for instance, meet this requirement. We simultaneously define the notion of an NIZK argument, in a manner completely analogous to the definition of an interactive ZK argument.
Definition 1 (NIZK [15]).
(
is a single-theorem NIZK proof system (resp., argument) for the language 
is chosen randomly, then the probability that 
To define a notion of NIZK where any polynomial number of proofs can be simulated, we change the Zero-knowledge condition as follows: 
(Same-String Zero Knowledge, cont.): The distribution on produced by
We make two observations regarding the definition of same-string NIZK:
-As done in [15] , the definition could equivalently be one that states that with all but negligible probability over the choices of common random reference strings, the simulation is computationally indistinguishable from real proofs supplied by the prover. We omit the details for lack of space.
-On the other hand, the definition above differs from the standard definition on unbounded zero knowledge only in the new requirement that the simulator produce truly uniform reference strings. It is easy to verify that all other changes are cosmetic. -In the next theorem, we show why we must speak only of same-string NIZK arguments, and not NIZK Proofs. 
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. We will show a contradiction to the soundness of the NIZK Proof System. First we note that the existence of one-way functions and Cook's theorem implies that there is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm such that for all non-uniform polynomial-time machines , if
, the probability that correctly decides whether
is only negligibly more than
It is implicit in the previous statement that with probability close to
. This hardness condition also implies that, in particular, the simulator must output proofs that are accepted with all but negligible probability when given as input
. At the same time, because the NIZK system is both same-string (adaptive) NIZK, it must be that the reference strings output by
come from a uniform distribution. Now, consider a cheating (unbounded) prover which, for any given random string, guesses the auxiliary information ¤ which maximizes the probability that the simulator outputs an accepting proof on inputs chosen according to
. Since the reference string that the prover encounters is also uniform, it follows that the cheating prover will have at least as high a probability of convincing a verifier to accept on input
. But we know that the simulator causes the verifier to accept with probability negligibly close to V . This contradicts the (unconditional) soundness of the NIZK proof system, completing the proof.
We also define the notion of an NIZK proof of knowledge [8] for an NP language 9 with witness relation D . Informally, the idea is that in an NIZK proof of knowledge, one should be able to extract the NP witness directly from the proof if given some special information about the reference string. We capture this notion by defining an extractor which produces a reference string together with some auxiliary information. The distribution on reference strings is statistically close to the uniform distribution. Given the auxiliary information and an NIZK proof, one can efficiently extract the witness. [8] show how to turn any NIZK proof system into a proof of knowledge under the assumption that public-key encryption schemes exist with sufficiently high density of valid public keys (called dense cryptosystems). We now recall the formal definition:
Definition 4 (NIZK proof of knowledge [8]).
( 
Non-malleable NIZK
We now proceed to define non-malleable NIZK. The intuition that our definition will seek to capture is to achive the strongest possible notion of non-malleability: "whatever an adversary can prove after seeing polynomially many NIZK proofs for statements of its choosing, it could have proven without seeing them, except for the ability to duplicate proofs." 7 Extending the notion of NIZK-PK of De Santis and Persiano [8] we define non-malleable NIZK-PK. We will make the definition with regard to simulated proofs, but note that one can make a similar definition with regard to actual proofs; we omit it due to lack of space.
be an unbounded NIZK proof system for the NP language 7 When interpreting the line "it could have proven without seeing them," we insist that an actual NP witness for the statement should be extractable from the adversary, which is a very strong NIZK-PK property. 8 To stress the main novelty of this definition, we will sometimes write "non-malleable in the explicit witness sense," to indicate that an explicit NP-witness can be extracted from any prover. We remark that our definition clearly implies the definition of [33] .
We also consider (and strengthen) another notion for NIZK called simulation soundness [33] which is related to non-malleability, but also can be useful in applicationsin particular, it suffices for building public-key encryption schemes secure against the strongest form of chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA2). The ordinary soundness property of proof systems states that with overwhelming probability, the prover should be incapable of convincing the verifier of a false statement. In this definition, we will ask that this remains the case even after a polynomially bounded party has seen any number of simulated proofs of his choosing. Note that simulation soundness is implied by our definition of non-malleability above.
be an unbounded NIZK proof system (or argument) for the language
9
. We say that 
First Construction
In this section, we exhibit our construction of NIZK proof systems that enjoy unbounded simulation-soundness. This construction is then readily modified using NIZK Proofs of Knowledge to construct proof systems with unbounded non-malleability (in the explicit witness sense), and robust NIZK arguments.
, we will require the existence of efficient single-theorem (adaptive) NIZK proof systems for a related language , described in detail below. Such proof systems exist under the assumption that trapdoor permutations exist [15] . Further, we will require the existence of one-way functions. To construct the proof systems with full non-malleability, we will require efficient single-theorem (adaptive) NIZK proofs of knowledge for the language
9
. Such proof systems exist under the assumption that dense cryptosystems exist and trapdoor permutations exist [8] .
Ingredients
Let F be the security parameter. We first specify the ingredients used in our construction: Commitment. We recall two elegant methods for constructing commitments. One, based on one-way permutations, will allow us to construct non-malleable NIZK arguments with unbiased simulations (i.e. robust NIZK). The other, which can be based merely on one-way functions, suffices to construct non-malleable NIZK proof systems.
The theorem of Goldreich and Levin [17] immediately yields the following bit commitment scheme from any one-way permutation on
Here, it should be that 
. We will sometimes write just
. Note that in this commitment scheme, every string of length ¢ F corresponds to a commitment to some unique string.
On the other hand, we recall the bit commitment protocol of Naor [27] based on pseudorandom generators (which can be built from any one-way function [23] ). Let be a pseudorandom generator stretching F bits to F bits. The Naor commitment procedure commits to a bit ¢ as follows:
, and as above the string ¡ should be selected uniformly at random among strings of length F . Again, we will sometimes write just
. It is shown in [27] that if and are both independent uniform distributions among strings of length . Furthermore, the probability that a random sample from ¡ ¥ could be interpreted as a commitment to any bit is at most ¢© a -in contrast to the one-way permutation based scheme above. Pseudo-Random Functions. We also let
be a family of pseudorandom functions [18] mapping
be a strong one-time signature scheme (see [29, 33] ), which can be constructed easily from universal one-way hash functions. Note that these objects can be constructed from one-way functions.
The Construction
Intuition. The NIZK system intuitively works as follows: First, a verification-key/signingkey pair
is chosen for the one-time signature scheme. Then the prover provides a NIZK proof that either £ is in the language, or that the reference string actually specifies a hidden pseudo-random function and that some specified value is the output of this pseudo-random function applied to the verification key
. Finally, this proof is itself signed using the signing key
We now describe the proof system ( for 9 precisely. Note that a third possibility for the NIZK proof is added below; this is a technical addition which simplifies our proof of correctness.
-Common random reference string. The reference string consists of three parts
is a string that we break up into
If we use the one-way permutation-based commitments, each .
3
There exists
We assume we have a single-theorem NIZK proof system for
9
(which we denote 
£
. The intuition for the simulator is that it sets up the reference string to be such that a hidden pseudo-random function really is specified, and instead of proving that £ is in the language, the simulator simply proves that it can evaluate this hidden pseudo-random function on the verification key of the signature scheme. Proof. As they are standard, we only sketch the proofs for completeness, soundness, and zero-knowledge. We provide the proof of unbounded simulation soundness in full.
Completeness follows by inspection. For the case of NIZK proofs, soundness follows by the fact that if is chosen uniformly at random, then the probability that can be interpreted as a commitment to any string is exponentially small, and likewise the probability that ¡ is in the image of the pseudorandom generator is exponentially small. For the case of NIZK arguments, we will in fact establish not only soundness but the stronger simulation soundness property below.
In the case where ¡ is based on a one-way permutation, we note that the simulator's distribution on is exactly uniform, thus satisfying this property required by samestring NIZK.
The proof of unbounded zero-knowledge follows almost exactly techniques of [15] . First we note that if we modify the real prover experiment by replacing the uniform with the distribution from the simulation (which in the case where ¡ is based on one-way permutations is no change at all), but keep the prover as is, then by the security of the commitment scheme, the views of the adversary are computationally indistinguishable. Now, [15] show that single-theorem NIZK implies unbounded witnessindistinguishability. Thus, since the simulator for ( uses only a different witness to prove the same statement, the view of the adversary in the simulator experiment is computationally indistinguishable from the view of the adversary in the modified prover experiment. Thus, unbounded zero-knowledge follows.
Unbounded simulation soundness -Overview. The proof of simulation soundness uses novel techniques based in part on a new application of pseudorandom functions to nonmalleability. We also use a combination of techniques from [13, 33] , [15] , and [4] . As we do not use set selection at all, the proof is quite different from that techniques from [12, 33] . The intuition is as follows: Through the use of the signature scheme, we know that any proof of a false theorem that the adversary might output which is different from the proofs provided by the simulator must use a verification key ¤ ! that is new. Otherwise, providing a valid signature would contradict the security of the signature scheme. Once we know that the verification key ¤ $ ! must be different, we observe that the only way to prove a false theorem with regard to the simulated reference string is to provide a value Unbounded simulation soundness -Full Proof. We recall from the definition of unbounded simulation soundness the adversary experiment, and substitute from our construction, to build experiment
. We must show that e ¡ F is negligible. We denote the components of the proof . Let be the list of verification keys output by the simulator. (Note that with all but exponentially small probability, these verification keys will all be distinct.) We first consider the probability
In the case where this is true, we know that 6 g @ , and therefore this implies that the adversary was able to produce a message/signature pair for 
be output of adversary. Let We now consider a third experiment, where we change part of the reference string ¡ to make it pseudorandom:
commitments to bits of 4 using randomness
. Run adversary
9
. When asked for proof for @ , do: as witness to construct proof
be output of adversary. Let are not used anywhere except to generate . Now, [15] prove that any adaptive single-theorem NIZK proof system is also adaptive unbounded witness-indistinguishable (see [15] for the definition of witness-indistinguishable non-interactive proofs). The definition of adaptive unbounded witness-indistinguishability directly implies that 
be output of adversary. Let 
be output of adversary. Let . This has the effect of making completely independent of the string
, and commitments to bits of
. By the security of the commitment scheme (either by Naor [27] or Goldreich-Levin [17] , depending on which scheme we use), we know that for every polynomial-time algorithm , we have that 
Thus, we have that 
be output of adversary. Let Proof. (Sketch) This follows from essentially the same argument as was used above to prove that ( is unbounded simulation-sound. We sketch the details here. To prove unbounded non-malleability in the explicit witness sense, we must exhibit a machine that with oracle access to the adversary produces an instance £ , together with a witness
, satisfying some relation. Recall that since ( is a proof of knowledge, there are extractor machines¨ and¨¡ . We describe our machine explicitly below: 
as witness to construct proof
be output of adversary. Let . We immediately see therefore that will fail to meet the conditions of non-malleability only if there is a non-negligible probability that the witness with only negligible probability. This shows that the probability of 's success is only negligibly different than the probability of success in the experiment y E ¡ F .
Second Construction
In this section, we exhibit our second construction of NIZK proof systems with unbounded adaptive non-malleability (in the explicit NP-witness sense). Our construction uses several tools, that can all be based on any NIZK proof of knowledge. In particular, this construction is based on a novel generalization of unduplicatable set selection [13, 12, 33] which we call hidden undiplicatable set selection which can be used to achieve unbounded non-malleability, and might be useful elsewhere. interest.
An informal description.
As a starting point, we still would like to use the paradigm of [15] in order to be able to simulate arbitrarily many proofs, when requested by the adversary. In other words, we want to create a proof system where the simulator can use some "fake" witness to prove arbitrarily many theorems adaptively requested by an adversary but the adversary must use a "real" witness when giving a new proof. One important step toward this goal is to use a new variation on the "unduplicatable set selection" technique (previously used in [13, 12, 33] ). While in previous uses of unduplicatable set selection, the selected set was sent in the clear (for instance, being determined by the binary expansion of a commitment key or a signature public key), in our construction such a set is hidden.
Specifically, on input £ , the prover picks a subset ! of bits of the random string and proves that £ @ 9
or the subset ! enjoys property (to ensure soundness is such that with overwhelming probability a subset of random bits does not enjoy ). The subset ! is specified by a string ¡ that is kept hidden from the verifier through a secure commitment. The same string ¡ is used to specify a pseudo-random function ¡ and the value of ¡ on a random 1 is then used as source of randomness for the key generation of a signature scheme. To prevent that the adversary does not follow these instructions in generating the public key, our protocol requires that a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof for the correctness of this computation is provided. Thus, the prover actually produces two zero-knowledge proofs: the "real one" (in which he proves that £ @ G 9 or the set ! enjoys property ) and the "auxiliary proof" (in which he proves correctness of the construction). Finally, the two proofs are signed with the public key generated.
This way, the generation of the public key for the signature scheme is tied to the selected set ! in the following sense: if an adversary tries to select the same set and the same input for the pseudo-random function as in some other proof he will be forced to use the same public key for the signature scheme (for which, however, she does not have a secret key).
Let us intuitively see why this protocol should satisfy unbounded non-malleable zero-knowledge. A crucial point to notice is that the simulator, when computing the multiple proofs requested by the adversary, will select a set of strings, set them to be pseudo-random and the remaining ones to be random, and always use this single selected set of strings, rather than a possibly different set for each proof, as done by a real prover; note however that the difference between these two cases is indistinguishable. As a consequence, the adversary, even after seeing many proofs, will not be able to generate a new proof without knowing its witness as we observe in the following three possible cases.
First, if the adversary tries to select a different set ! (from the one used in the simulation), then she is forced to use a random string. Therefore ! does not enjoy and therefore she can produce a convincing real proof only if she has a witness for £ @ i 9
. Second, if the adversary tries to select the same set of strings as the one used in the simulation and the same input for the pseudo-random function as at least in one of the proofs she has seen, then she is forced to use the same signature public key and therefore will have to forge a signaturewhich violates the security of the signature scheme used.
Third, if the adversary tries to select the same set of strings as the one used in the simulation and an input for the pseudo-random function different from all the proofs she has seen, she will either break the secrecy of the commitment scheme or the pseudorandomness of the pseudo-random function used.
Tools. We use the following tools:
On input a -bit string In the description of our proof system we will use the following polynomial-time relations. In Appendix B we present a proof of Theorem 4 (note that, as done for our first construction, we can use part of this proof to prove Theorem 5).
A Discussion of usefulness of ZK in multiparty settings
Goldreich, Micali, and Wigderson [19] introduced a powerful paradigm for using zeroknowledge proofs in multiparty protocols. The idea is to use zero-knowledge proofs to force parties to behave according to a specified protocol in a manner that protects the secrets of each party. In a general sense, the idea is to include with each step in a protocol a zero-knowledge proof that the party has acted correctly. Intuitively, because each participant is providing a proof, they can only successfully give such a proof if they have, in truth, acted correctly. On the other hand, because their proof is zero knowledge, honest participants need not fear losing any secrets in the process of proving that they have acted correctly.
To turn this intuition into a proof that no secrets are lost, the general technique is to simulate the actions of certain parties without access to their secrets. The definition of zero knowledge (in both interactive and non-interactive settings) is based on the existence of a simulator which can produce simulated proofs of arbitrary statements. This often makes it easy to simulate the actions of parties (which we call the high-level simulation) as needed to prove that no secrets are lost.
The problem of malleability, however, can arise here in a subtle way. One feature of simulators for zero-knowledge proofs is that they can simulate proofs of false statements. In fact, this is often crucial in the high-level simulation of parties, because without knowing their secrets it is often not possible to actually follow the protocol they way they are supposed to. However, on the other hand, it may also be crucial in the high-level simulation that the proofs received by a simulated party be correct! As an example which arises in the context of chosen-ciphertext security for public-key encryption [28] , consider the following: Suppose in a protocol, one party is supposed to send encryptions of a single message under two different public keys ! and ! ¡ . According to our paradigm, this party should also provide a zero-knowledge proof that indeed these two encryptions are encryptions of the same message. Now, suppose the receiver is supposed to know both decryption keys . But suppose that because we are simulating the receiver, we only know one key F . Suppose further that the simulator needs to decypher the message in order to be able to continue the protocol. Now, if we could always trust proofs to be correct, knowing just one key would be enough, since we would know for sure that the two encryptions are encrypting the same message, and therefore the decryption of any one of them would provide us with .
Here is where the malleability problem arises: Perhaps a simulated party occasionally provides simulated proofs of false statements. If the proof system is malleable, another party could turn around and provide the receiver above with two inconsistent encryptions and a false proof that they are consistent. Now, in this case, the behavior of the simulated party would be different from the behavior of the real party, because the simulator would not notice this inconsistency. Indeed, this very problem arises in the context of chosen-ciphertext security, and illustrates how malleable proofs can make it difficult to construct simulators. If we look more closely, we see that more specifically, the problem is the possibility that an adversary can use simulated proofs to construct proofs for false statements. Sahai [33] considered this problem by introducing the notion of a simulation-sound proof system, although he is not able to construct simulationsound NIZK proof systems immune to any polynomial number of false proofs. (Note that our notion of non-malleability implies simulation soundness.) In this work, we show how to achieve simulation-sound NIZK proof systems immune to any polynomial number of false proofs. Our construction of such NIZK systems requires the assumption of one-way trapdoor permutations -a possibly weaker computational assumption then dense cryptosystems.
B Proof for Our Second Construction
First of all we need to show that the proposed protocol is an efficient NIZK proof system for the language equal to the domain of relation D ; namely, that it satisfies the completeness and soundness requirements, and that the prover runs in polynomialtime, when given the appropriate witness. It is immediate to check that the properties of completeness and soundness are verified by the described protocol. In particular, for the completeness and the efficiency of the prover, note that since the honest prover has a witness for relation D , she can compute the proof , the verifier can be convinced with probability at most exponentially small.
In the rest of the proof, we prove the non-malleability property of our proof system. We start by presenting a construction for the adaptive simulator algorithm and the nonmalleability machine, and then prove that, together with the above proof system, they satisfy the non-malleability property of Definition 5
The adaptive simulator algorithm. We now describe the simulator ! algorithm for the proof system presented. 
